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Abstract
I estimate a pure-characteristics discrete choice model of the demand for auto-
mobile engine and body style variants, using market-level data. Revealed prefer-
ence bounds and imposed bounds on the willingness to pay for characteristics as
a percentage of product price are sufficient to identify nonparametric taste distri-
butions. Substitution patterns as determined by closest substitutes appear very
realistic. The model can be estimated on a single cross-section of data.
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1 Introduction
I estimate a model of the demand for automobile variants based on the semiparamet-
ric pure characteristics model of Bajari and Benkard (2005), modified by imposing
bounds on consumers’ willingness to pay for a characteristic as a percentage of the
price of the product they purchased. As in the random-coefficients logit literature,
utility is linear in product characteristics and tastes for characteristics have a dis-
tribution in the population of consumers. The model differs from this literature
in two respects: (i) taste distributions are estimated nonparametrically, and (ii)
consumers do not have a taste for products (like the logit term) that is unrelated
to observable characteristics.
A first stage estimates a scalar unobservable product characteristic for each al-
ternative. A second stage finds the sets of coefficients that can rationalise the choice
of each product. Under utility maximisation, the choice of a given alternative im-
plies that this alternative’s utility is greater than those of all the other alternatives.
These inequalities imply bounds on the combinations of taste coefficients a con-
sumer may have given that he chose the given alternative. In principle, as the
number of products goes to infinity, the sets of implied taste coefficients for each
product should become singletons. In practice, only bounds for each alternative are
implied by the data. Bajari and Benkard (2005) proceed to aggregate the bounds
derived from individual choices to get bounds on the aggregate taste distributions.
Any product which has less of a given characteristic than the consumer’s chosen
product provides a lower bound on that consumer’s taste for the characteristic
(conditional on his tastes for the other characteristics). Vice versa, any product
with more of the characteristic provides an upper bound on the consumer’s taste.
Some characteristics take on only a few discrete values, and in many cases only
two: a 0 or 1. For instance a car either has automatic or manual transmission.
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For dummy (binary) variables we obtain either only lower bounds (if the chosen
product has a 1) or only upper bounds (if 0). This means that the set of taste
coefficients will not be closed.
Furthermore, since bounds on the taste for one characteristic depends on the
tastes for other characteristics, this results in less tight bounds for those character-
istics too. For instance, let product A be high in characteristic 1 and characteristic
2, where 2 is binary. If we have no upper bound on the taste for 2, a consumer may
choose A because of an extremely strong preference for 2 regardless of its value of
characteristic 1.
This problem can be mitigated by imposing conservative bounds on the distri-
butions of tastes.1 I propose to use bounds on the willingness-to-pay for charac-
teristics, expressed as a percentage of the product chosen. This provides a way of
choosing conservative bounds that are economically meaningful, and which vary
with preferences.
I estimate the model using data on sales of new car model variants in Norway
in 2004. I find that elasticities are unreasonably high. This confirms the finding
from Bajari and Benkard’s application to computer demand. Like them, I find
that elasticities become much more reasonable when the number of products in the
choice set is reduced. In this case there is an obvious way to do that, by removing
all but the bestselling variant of each model. This leaves a choice set with just
one set of characteristics for each model, like in BLP and most previous estimation
of demand for cars on market level data. Substitution patterns appear to be very
reasonable. Since I use a large number of product characteristics, whereas the
number is very limited in BLP for computational reasons, the model appears to
predict each product’s closest substitutes very well. The results for the full choice
1Bajari and Benkard briefly mention this in the NBER version of the paper, but to not discuss how
to obtain those bounds.
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set indicate that it there may be reasons to hold on to the idiosyncratic (logit) taste
term, contrary the commonly held view that tractability is the only reason to keep
it. This is an issue for further work.
The next section provides some background from the literature on demand esti-
mation for differentiated products. The third section sets out the theoretical model
and discusses identification. The fourth section explains the estimation procedure
and describes the data. The fifth section presents and discusses the results, while
the last section concludes.
2 Literature
This section reviews parts of the literature on estimation of demand systems for
differentiated products. Since the model in this paper can be viewed as a multi-
dimensional extension of the vertical differentiation mode of Bresnahan (1987) I
give and overview of that model. I then summarise a recent discussion about the
desirability of idiosyncratic (e.g. logit) taste terms in discrete-choice models.
2.1 Bresnahan’s model of vertical differentiation
Bresnahan (1987) estimates car demand using a vertical differentiation model like
those in Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Shaked and Sutton (1982). In this model a
consumer’s utility is
uij = xjβi − pj, (1)
where the characteristic, xj, is a scalar representing ”quality”.
2 The taste parameter
β has an estimated density on a nonnegative support, so that all consumers have a
positive marginal valuation of the characteristic. Consumers make different choices
2Quality is an estimated function of characteristics. The important thing in this context is that all
consumers have positive marginal utility for the characteristic.
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because they have different valuations of the characteristic relative to price.
Utility for each product can be pictured as a linear function of β, where −pj
is the intercept with the vertical axis, and xj is the gradient. Each consumer is
located somewhere on the horizontal axis, and chooses the product with the utility
line that is highest at this β-value. For all products to have positive demand, it is
necessary that if one product has strictly lower quality than another, it must also
have a strictly lower price. It follows that the utility lines are ordered in a pattern
where the lowest-quality product has the highest-lying line close to the vertical axis,
because it has the highest vertical intercept (lowest price). At some point this line
is crossed by the product which is above it in the quality ranking (steeper slope).
For high enough βs, this line is superseded by the third-lowest quality product, and
so on. In general, the point where the utility lines for products j and j +1 cross is
given by
βj,j+1 =
pj+1 − pj
xj+1 − xj
. (2)
If products are indexed in order of increasing quality, product j’s market share is
then
Fβ
(
βj,j+1
)
− Fβ
(
βj−1,j
)
, (3)
where Fβ is the cumulative distribution function of β. Bresnahan assumes a uniform
density for β.
Demand for a product is then proportional to the length of the interval on the
horizontal axis where this product’s utility line is the highest:
qj = δ · [β
j,j+1 − βj−1,j] = δ ·
[
pj+1 − pj
xj+1 − xj
−
pj − pj−1
xj − xj−1
]
, (4)
where δ is the (constant) density function. The cross-price and own-price demand
derivatives are (δ/(xj+1 − xj)) and −(δ/(xj+1 − xj)) − (δ/(xj − xj−1)), so the
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more similar the products are in terms of quality, the higher the price elasticities.
Graphically, price substitution happens in the following way: When the price of
a product goes up, its utility line shifts down since the vertical intercept, −p, is
lower. This means that the point where it rises above the utility of the lower-quality
neighbour is shifted outwards, and the point where it is superseded by its higher-
quality neighbour is shifted inwards, shrinking the interval where it is above the
other lines.
2.2 Idiosyncratic tastes
Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) point out that including idiosyncratic error terms, like
the logit term, in utility is equivalent to including a dummy for every product,
and imposing draws from the extreme value distribution as the coefficients on these
dummy variables. This implies that the introduction of a new product adds one
dimension to unobserved characteristics space. Since the expected difference be-
tween the logit term of any two products is the same regardless of the number
of products, there is no congestion in unobserved characteristics space (Ackerberg
and Rysman 2005). This is counterintuitive in the sense that one would expect
products to become closer as their number increases, as in a Hotelling model. The
congestion does occur in the observed part of characteristics space, but the addi-
tional dimension of unobserved characteristics space allows every new product to
be differentiated in a new way. The lack of congestion appears to overestimate
the benefit of variety to consumers (Petrin 2002). One would expect that as the
number of products goes to infinity, every product should have a perfect substitute,
i.e. that every consumer could substitute to some other product with zero utility
loss. Bajari and Benkard (2003) show that in any logit model such utility losses
are bounded away from zero in the limit.
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Ackerberg and Rysman (2005) propose to let the distribution of the idiosyncratic
term change with the number of products in the choice set to allow for congestion
of product space. Berry and Pakes (2007) do away with the idiosyncratic term
altogether. In this paper I estimate a model based on the pure characteristics
model of Bajari and Benkard (2005). That model will be discussed in detail in the
next section.
A central question is whether it is desirable to dispense with the idiosyncratic
taste term. There is a feeling that the logit error lacks justification: ”these ap-
proaches [pure characteristics models] are intuitively very attractive in the sense
that there are no ad-hoc logit errors” (Ackerberg and Rysman 2005). Because the
existing estimation procedures do not allow much variation in specifications, ”it
is harder for the authors to provide a sense for how their various maintained as-
sumptions impact their results” (Reiss and Wolak 2006). This point holds for the
inclusion of the logit error, as well as the parametric assumptions on the taste dis-
tributions. While most IO applications do not have sufficient data to dispense with
functional form restrictions, recent work (Blow, Browning, and Crawford 2008) has
formalised the data requirements for nonparametric identification of characteristics
models.
3 Model and Identification
3.1 The model
There are J products defined as bundles of K characteristics (xj , ξj), where xj ∈
RK−1 is observed, and ξj ∈ R is not observed by the researcher. The unobserved
characteristic represents such things as style, quality and service, collapsed into
a scalar value. Each consumer chooses one product. This is the product which
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maximises his or her utility over the set of all products. Utility is a linear function
of the product characteristics and price. The fact that consumers choose different
products is uniquely accounted for by differences in their tastes for characteristics
and in their price sensitivity. The final goal of the analysis is to estimate the
joint distribution of the taste coefficients, i.e. the linear coefficients in the utility
function.
A consumer’s ranking of products is unaffected by the scale of utility. Utility can
therefore be multiplied by an individual-specific constant, and an individual-specific
constant can be added to it, without changing the consumer’s utility maximising
product. The following normalisation is therefore permitted: All price coefficients
are set to −1 (multiply by individual-specific constant, the inverse of the price
coefficient), and utility for the outside good of not buying a car is set to 0 (adding
an individual-specific constant, minus the utility of the outside good). Utility is
then given by
uij = xjβi − pj, (5)
where i indexes individuals and j indexes products. For simplicity of notation, the
vector xj includes the unobserved characteristic as well as all the other character-
istics.
3.2 The hedonic price function
Using the assumption that utility is strictly increasing in the unobserved character-
istic ξ for all products and for all consumers (and two mild regularity conditions),
Bajari and Benkard (2005) show that for any two products j and j′ with strictly
positive demand, it must be true that
1. If xj = xj′ and ξj = ξj′ , then pj = pj′ .
2. If xj = xj′ and ξj > ξj′ , then pj > pj′ .
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3. |pj − pj′ | ≤M(|xj − xj′ |+ |ξj − ξj′ |) for some M <∞.
Define a mapping from observed and unobserved characteristics to price. Because
of 1 the mapping is a function, since a point in the domain of the mapping maps
to a unique point in its image set. Because of 2 the mapping is strictly increasing
in the unobserved characteristic. Because of 3 the mapping defines a (Lipschitz)
continuous surface. The price surface is denoted p(x, ξ). In a logit demand model,
such a surface does not necessarily exist, since two products with the same charac-
teristics and different price both can have strictly positive demand because of the
idiosyncratic taste term. The price function depends on the nature of competition,
marginal costs, consumer preferences, and the products present in the market. If
any of these primitives change, the shape of the price surface is also likely to change.
The price function expresses the relationship between prices and characteristics in
equilibrium in a particular market. See Bajari and Benkard (2005) pp. 1247-8 for
a discussion of the price function.
3.3 Identification of the unobserved characteristic
The assumption used for identification is that the unobserved characteristic is inde-
pendent of the observed characteristics. This assumption is slightly stronger than
the mean independence assumption in BLP.3 The unobserved characteristic has no
inherent units, and so it is only identified up to a monotonic transformation. It
is therefore assumed that it has been normalised so the marginal distribution of ξ
is U(0, 1). Bajari and Benkard (2005) use the proof of identification provided by
Matzkin (2003). The identification result says that {ξj}j=1,...,J is identified when
the prices of many products are observed in a market, so that the joint distribution
3Manski (1994) discusses various orthogonality conditions.
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F (p, x) is known. The proof is:
Fp|x=xj(pj) = Pr(p(x, ξ) ≤ pj|x = xj)
= Pr(ξ ≤ p−1(x, pj)|x = xj)
= Pr(ξ ≤ p−1(xj , pj)) (6)
= p−1(xj , pj)
= ξj
The second line holds since the price function has an inverse for a given x since it
is strictly increasing and continuous in ξ. The third line holds by the independence
between x and ξ. The fourth line holds because the q-quantile of U(0, 1) equals q.
3.4 Identification of the taste coefficients
In the second stage, the unobserved characteristic recovered in the first stage is a
given, and treated in the same way as the observed characteristics. It is therefore
simply included as one of the elements of the x-vector, for notational convenience.
For product j to maximise utility, it must be the case that
xjβ − pj ≥ xlβ − pl, ∀l 6= j. (7)
Let X˜j be the (J − 1) × K-matrix whose columns are the vectors xj − xl, l =
1, . . . , j − 1, j + 1, . . . , J , and let p˜j be the J − 1 vector with elements pj − pl,
running over the same indices as X˜j . Then the condition that product j maximise
utility can be written as a system of linear inequalities on standard matrix form.
The set of taste coefficients permitted by the revealed preference condition (7) for
product j is
Aj ≡ {β | X˜jβ ≤ p˜j}. (8)
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This means that if a consumer chooses product j, his or her vector of taste coef-
ficients must be inside the K-dimensional convex polyhedron Aj. Market share is
the share of the population with taste vectors falling within each of the polyhedra.
It is possible to proceed to construct a demand system without making any
further assumptions. Bajari and Benkard (2005) provide estimators for upper and
lower bounds on the cumulative distribution function of tastes. The advantage of
this approach is that features of demand functions can be estimated with only very
weak assumptions. It seems difficult to obtain useful bounds on price elasticities in
this way, however.
The alternative is to try to obtain a ”point estimate” of the aggregate taste
distribution. When there is only observations from one market, the distribution
of probability mass inside each A-set is not identified. However, when the number
of products goes to infinity in such a way that the A-sets are partioned ever more
finely, in the limit these sets will be points (see Bajari and Benkard (2005) for
a proof). Accordingly it can be expected that with a large number of products,
the distribution of probability mass inside these sets will not be important. The
estimation of the taste distribution can be regarded as entirely nonparametric, in
which case it is possibly not fully identified. Alternatively, it can be assumed that
the distribution is uniform over each A-set, but is otherwise unrestricted in the
estimation, in which case it is fully identified.
4 Estimation
4.1 First stage
The unobserved characteristic is given in (6) as a quantile of a conditional distri-
bution: Fp|x=xj(pj). The nonparametric estimation of a conditional distribution
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functions and quantiles are well known problems. Matzkin (2003) suggests the
following estimator, based on Nadaraya (1964):
Fˆp|x=xj(pj) =
∑J
i=1 k˜1(
pj−pi
h
)k2(
xj−xi
h
)∑J
i=1 k2(
xj−xi
h
)
, (9)
where k2(·) is a multidimensional kernel, k˜1(u) =
∫ u
−∞ k1(s)ds, and h is the band-
width.
My data have around 900 products and 30 characteristics. It is not possible
to estimate a quantile of a 30-dimensional density using just 900 data points. I
follow Bajari and Benkard (2005) in assuming that the price function is additively
separable in most of the characteristics, and then estimate the nonadditive part
nonparametrically after removing the linear effects of the other variables. The
price function is then p(x, ξ) = p(xA, ξ) + xBγ, where (xA, xB) is a partitioning of
the vector x.4 The γ was found by an OLS regression on the equation
pj = x
A
j θ + x
B
j γ, (10)
and the price data used for the nonparametric estimation of the unobserved char-
acteristic were
p˜j = pj − x
B
j γˆ. (11)
I used Epanechnikov kernels for the estimator in (9) (see for instance Martinez and
Martinez (2002)):
k1(ψ) =
3
4
(1− ψ2), −1 ≤ ψ ≤ 1 (12)
The bandwidths were chosen according to the Epanechnikov bandwidth rule (see
Azzalini (1981)) h = 1.3σˆn−
1
3 , where n is the number of observations and σˆ is the
4xA = (horsepower, cyl.vol., length).
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empirical standard deviation of the data.
4.2 Second stage
Many of the characteristics used in the estimation are indicator variables. The
revealed preference bounds in (7) give no upper bound on the coefficient for that
characteristic for the people who buy the product with the highest value of that
product, and conversely, no lower bound for the product with the lowest value
of a characteristic. This problem is limited in the case of continuous character-
istics, since there will usually only be one maximum and one minimum for each
characteristic. For indicator variables, however, all products are either the (weak)
maximum or (weak) minimum of that characteristic. This means that none of the
A-sets (sets of coefficients that rationalise a given choice) will be closed. Leav-
ing the coefficient for some characteristics unbounded also has repercussions in the
sense that an extreme value for one characteristic often must be matched by an
extreme value of another characteristic in order for the product to be the utility
maximiser. I therefore imposed some conservative bounds on the coefficients. Since
the price coefficient is normalised to -1, the coefficients of the characteristics have
the convenient interpretation of willingness-to-pay for a one unit increase in the
value of that characteristic. Accordingly, the bounds are formulated as bounds on
the willingness-to-pay for characteristics, given as a percentage of the price of the
product in question. (See table 3 for the bounds).
In the NBER version of their 2005 paper, Bajari and Benkard suggest a multi-
stage Gibbs sampler to take random draws from the A-sets. The Gibbs algorithm is
a general principle that can be used to draw from a multivariate density f(x) which
is difficult to draw from directly, but whose univariate conditional densities can be
drawn from. Take a starting value x(t), and generate X
(t+1)
1 ∼ f1(x1|x
(t)
2 . . . , x
(t)
K ),
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then X
(t+1)
2 ∼ f2(x2|x
(t+1)
1 , x
(t)
3 . . . , x
(t)
K ), and so on. This sequence converges to
f(x) (Robert and Casella 2004).
The revealed preference condition for the coefficient of characteristic 1 as given
in (7) can be rewritten as, for all l 6= j,
β1 ≥
∑
k 6=1 βk(xl,k − xj,k)− (pl − pj)
xj,1 − xl,1
if xj,1 > xl,1 (13)
β1 ≤
∑
k 6=1 βk(xl,k − xj,k)− (pl − pj)
xj,1 − xl,1
if xj,1 < xl,1, (14)
and similarly for the other coefficients. Denote the right hand side of the inequalities
above B(j, l, 1). This means that in general, for the product j, every other product
provides either an upper or a lower bound on the coefficient values which could lead
to the purchase of product j. The bounds based on willingness-to-pay, as described
above, denoted as b1 and b1, provide additional bounds.
Suppose the distribution of probability mass inside each A-set is uniform. Even
if this assumption is not maintained later, random draws under the assumption of
a uniform distribution will reveal the support of the random vector βj , and this
support is precisely the set Aj. Given a starting value, β
(0)
j , which is inside Aj , it
must be true that
βj,1|β
(0)
j,2 , . . . , β
(0)
j,K ∼ U(βj,1,min, βj,1,max), (15)
where the parameters of the univariate uniform depends on the conditioned-on
betas in the following way:
βj,1,min = max{bj,1 , max{B(j, l, 1) | l 6= j and xj,1 > xl,1}} (16)
βj,1,max = min{bj,1 , min{B(j, l, 1) | l 6= j and xj,1 < xl,1}}. (17)
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Given the starting value, β
(0)
j , the algorithm follows the Gibbs procedure described
above, with equations (15-17) describing the conditional densities that are drawn
from at each stage.
From a computational point of view, the Gibbs sampler is quick, taking about
a minute to generate 3000 31-dimensional draws. What proved to be the difficult
part was to find a starting point, i.e. any point satisfying (7). Bajari and Benkard
(2005) report that they used as starting values coefficients derived from first-order
conditions under the assumption that product space is filled up (so that consumers
can pick a product anywhere in characteristics space). This method did not work for
my data. The only method which turned out to be reliable was to use the centre
of the Chebyshev ball (the largest K-dimensional ball wich can be fit inside the
polyehedron), computed by Komei Fukuda’s cdd5 code, implemented for Matlab in
MPT 6.
To draw from the full joint distribution of the betas, I used ns = 1500 draws
for each product. The first 1500 of the 3000 draws are burn-in draws for the Gibbs
sampler. Each draw from Aj is weighted by the market share of product j. The
simulated market share, used to compute price elasticities, is
sˇj =
J∑
l=1
sl
nsl
nsl∑
i=1
1(cli = j), (18)
where sl is the observed market share of product l, i.e. the proportion of car buyers
whose coefficients are in the set Al. cli denotes the product which maximises utility
given the i-th draw of coefficient vector from Al. 1(·) is the indicator function.
5Komei Fukuda, http://www.ifor.math.ethz.ch/˜fukuda/cdd
¯
home/cdd.html
6M. Kvasnica, P. Grieder and M. Baotic´, Multi-Parametric Toolbox (MPT),
http://control.ee.ethz.ch/˜mpt/
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4.3 Data
The data contain sales and product characteristics for all the 904 new car model
variants sold in Norway in 2004. Previous demand analyses for cars have always
treated a model (”name plate”) as one product, and have used the characteristics of
the cheapest or most sold (”baseline”) variant as the characteristics of the model. In
fact most models are marketed with a large number of different variants, varying in
bodytype, engine size, transmission, or fuel type. Table 1 shows the 21 best selling
models (arranged by price), some characteristics of the modal variant of each of
these models, along with the mean, minimum and maximum of the characteristics
across variants of this model. It also shows the number of variants of the model,
total sales of the model, sales of the modal variant, as well as the model’s rank in
total sales. Table 2 does the same for a range of models chosen to represent the
whole spectrum of car models, from the most expensive sports car through family
cars to the smallest hatchback. Prices are list prices. It is known that transaction
prices generally are lower than list prices, but these are not available apart from in
smaller surveys which cover only a few products. The tables include the unobserved
characteristic among the displayed characteristics. This will be discussed in the next
section.
Table 3 shows the 30 characteristics used for estimation, along with their mean
across available products, the sales weighted mean, and the minimum and max-
imum. It also shows the imposed bounds on the willingness to pay for one unit
more of the characteristic. For example, a consumer’s willingness-to-pay for an
additional metre of length of a car is bounded above at 100% of the price of the car
that the consumer actually bought. So if a consumer buys a car that costs 300.000
kroner (appr. £28,000), it is assumed that his willingness to pay for an additional
0.1 litre of cylinder volume on a car is bounded above to 30.000 kroner. For some
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characteristics it is assumed that willingness-to-pay is bounded below by zero, i.e.
that nobody would pay a positive amount of money to have less of these charac-
teristics. On the other hand, this possibility is allowed for many characteristics.
For instance, if somebody does not like German cars, he or she may be willing to
pay a little extra to have a car which is not German. The constraints are meant to
be conservative, and it appears unlikely that they should be violated by the true
distribution of taste coefficients. As discussed above, they can still contribute to
identification of the model.
5 Results
5.1 The unobserved characteristic
The estimated unobserved characteristic ranges from 0.07 to 0.99 and has a mean
of 0.52. Tables 1 and 2 show the value of the unobservable for the modal variant of
a selection of models, as well as its mean, minimum and maximum across variants
of each model. The unobserved characteristic is independent of all other charac-
teristics (not including price). Generally speaking, a product with a high price
relative to its characteristics will have a high value of the unobserved characteris-
tic, since high quality, style or prestige is required for it to have positive demand
in the presence of other, cheaper products with similar observed characteristics.
This is illustrated by table 4. All Mercedes E-class variants have high values of
the unobserved characteristic. This is consistent with the perception of Mercedes
as a prestigious brand. The Peugeot 607 is a comparable car to the Mercedes E
for similar engine sizes. A comparison reveals that the unobserved characteristic
is lower for the Peugeot for similar specifications, presumably reflecting the higher
prestige of the Mercedes. A similar pattern is found by comparing the Audi A4
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with the Skoda Octavia, two similar models where the first is regarded as more
prestigious than the second.
Variation within models is also illuminating. The low-end Mercedes E variants
have extremely high values for the unobserved characteristic, reflecting some fea-
ture which gives them positive demand in spite of their very high prices relative to
observed characteristics. It is pertinent to ask how the unobserved characteristic
can vary so much within a given model. If the unobserved characteristic is taken
to represent a specific feature, such as ”prestige”, it seems all Mercedes E should
have the same value, or that the variants with bigger engines should have higher
prestige. However, each variant is a package of characteristics, and the ”prestige”
derived from a big engine or a German manufacturer goes into those observed char-
acteristics. The unobserved characteristic can therefore not simply be interpreted
as ”prestige” or ”quality”, but rather as the amount of prestige or quality that the
car has beyond what is derived from its observed characteristics. Accordingly, a 5
litre top-of-the-range Mercedes E is indeed more prestigious than the bottom-of-the-
range 1.8 litre version, but it is already clear from its observed characteristics that
it is a very prestigious car. This is not the case with the 1.8 litre version however,
and the model therefore assigns it a higher unobserved characteristic. Compared
to a 2 litre Peugeot 607 which sells for 365,000 kroner, the 1.8 litre Mercedes must
have substantial unobserved merit in order to warrant its 512,000 kroner price tag.
5.2 Taste coefficients
The draws generated in the second stage of the estimation are uniformly distributed
inside the 30-dimensional revealed preference polyhedra. Figure 6 shows scatter
plots of the joint densities of the taste coefficients for length and cylinder volume of
consumers who buy three different variants of each of the models Audi A4, A6 and
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A8. The variants are the bottom-of-the-range, a middle-of-the-range, and the top-
of-the-range variants of each model in terms of price and engine size. The scatter
plots are the projections of points distributed in a 30-dimensional space onto a 2-
dimensional space. This explains why the sets do not look like polyhedra and the
points do not look like they are uniformly distributed.
Taste coefficients for length and cylinder volume are bounded below by zero and
above by the price of the product the consumer has chosen (cf. table 3). In the
justification of the bounds I said that they are meant to be conservative bounds,
and that they are unlikely to be violated by the true taste distribution in the
population. At the same time, the model is not identified without these bounds.
This means that the distribution of taste coefficient draws generated by the model
will be constrained by the bounds to varying degrees. It does not follow from this
that the bounds are too tight. Instead, this fact follows from the observation that
revealed preference conditions from a cross-section of data are not sufficient to fully
identify the taste distributions. The aim is to see whether the joint constraints
of revealed preference and bounds on the willingness-to-pay are sufficient to yield
useful predictions. It is clear that in the case of the top A8, the bounds severely
restricts the area within which the draws fall, as points accumulate close to the
upper bounds. Since the biggest A8 faces few or no competitors that are longer
or have a bigger engine, revealed preference does not constrain the draws at all
upwards. The mid A4, on the other hand, is located in a very densely occupied
area of characteristics space. The large number of close competitors means that
revealed preference provides upper constraints that are well below the upper bounds
on willingness-to-pay.
Comparing the top or mid A4 with the bottom and mid A6 reveals an interesting
pattern. The A4 is smaller than the A6, but otherwise the two models are similar
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with respect to design, quality and service. The different choices of buyers of the A4
and buyers of the A6, should therefore be due to a large extent to different tastes
for length. This is indeed confirmed. Mid A4 buyers have a similar distribution of
taste for volume to mid A6 buyers (cylinder volume being the same), but markedly
lower tastes for length. The reason to pay 30.000 kroner to get an A6 instead of
a very similar, but slightly shorter A4, is that the willingness-to-pay for length is
high. Consumers who buy the top A4 have extremely high willingness-to-pay for
cylinder volume, but do not care much about length. Conversely, bottom A6 buyers
care very little about engine size, but have a very strong taste for length. The same
pattern is confirmed by comparing the A6 and the A8.
To find the aggregate distribution of taste parameters, the draws for each of the
904 variants are aggregated, and weighted by the market share of each car, cor-
responding to the proportion of consumers represented by those particular draws.
Since probability mass is uniformly distributed inside each taste coefficient polyhe-
dron, it is essential for the approximation of the true aggregate taste distribution
that each polyhedron is small in some sense. As discussed in the identification
section, if the number of products goes to infinity in such a way that all poly-
hedra collapse to points, the distribution resulting from the model will equal the
true distribution in the limit. The scatter plots in figure 6 give the impression
that the polyhedra are quite chunky. However, if one imagines a 30-dimensional
rectangle with sides similar to those formed by the scatter plot of the top A8,
this 30-dimensional rectangle will contain all 904 taste coefficient polyhedra. These
polyhedra are disjoint, and so much smaller than the rectangle which contains them
all. Furthermore, most polyhedra are contained in a much smaller volume, with a
few fringe products like the top A8 having much larger polyhedra.
Figure 6 shows kernel smoothed graphs of the aggregate marginal densities of
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some taste coefficients. Compared to the scatter plots in Figure 6, where points
look almost uniformly distributed, these densities have much more probability mass
concentrated at certain (low) levels. The products with high sales are concentrated
in certain areas of characteristics space. In practice that means that many people
have tastes leading them to prefer products in those areas. For the purposes of
this discussion, that in turn means that draws in those areas are given much larger
(market share) weights. All the marginal densities have peaks close to zero. This
is most marked in the cases of length and cylinder volume. These coefficients are
well constrained by revealed preference, because the corresponding characteristics
are continuous and exhibit large variation in the data. The marginal densities for
some dummy variables have less sharp peaks, because their taste coefficients are
not identified as well by revealed preference, and therefore are more spread out.
The BLP model assumed independence between the taste coefficients for dif-
ferent characteristics. This assumption was made for reasons of feasibility in the
estimation. Figure 3 shows kernel smoothed pairwise joint aggregate densities for
some taste coefficients. The graphs exhibit some interesting examples of depen-
dence between taste parameters that would be ruled out by BLP’s assumption.
First, there is a substantial proportion of the population with a relatively high
taste for both cylinder volume and length, whereas very few people have that high
tastes for only one of these characteristics and not the other. Secondly, there are
many consumers with strong preferences for both four-wheel drive and a SUV body
type. This is not surprising, but nevertheless a fact that should not be ruled out by
distributional assumptions. Thirdly, an inverse relationship exists between taste for
cylinder volume and disutility of fuel costs. Again a substantial group of consumers
have a very low disutility of fuel costs and at the same time a very high preference
for cylinder volume, whereas hardly anyone has such high tastes for cylinder volume
21
while at the same time disliking fuel costs very much. Finally, the perhaps most
interesting example shows that there is a strong inverse relationship between tastes
for German cars and tastes for Japanese or Korean cars. Especially, consumers who
have a high willingness to pay for their car being German, get a high disutility from
an Asian car. Also, many consumers who value Asian cars dislike German cars. All
these examples are intuitively appealing, and support the case that independence
between taste parameters is an undesirable assumption.
5.3 Elasticities
Elasticities were computed by finding the numerical derivative of the simulated
market shares given by (18) w.r.t. each product. I did this in two ways. Method I
let consumers face a choice set containing all variants of every model, leaving them
with 904 choices. Derivatives were computed with finite differences by letting the
price increase for all variants of the relevant model, and then looking at how the
joint market share of all variants of the model changed. To turn the derivatives into
elasticities, they where multiplied by the price of the modal variant, and divided by
the original joint market share. In method II, I simply removed all variants apart
from the modal variant of each model from the choice set, and simulated demands
with this new choice set.
The median own price elasticity from method I was -35, and -13 in method II.
BLP report own price elasticities that mostly range from -3 to -6, and say that
General Motors’ own economists found these estimates plausible. Table 5 shows
the own price elasticities, markups (price minus marginal cost) and markups as
a percentage of price for the 50 best selling products in the market, computed
using method II and the assumption of a Nash equilibrium in prices, with profit
maximising entities being the 16 car manufacturing companies which produce the
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197 products on the market. Table 6 reproduces implied percentage markups for a
sample of products reported in BLP. BLP’s markups are higher, although they only
report a few examples. Their overall mean percentage markup is 23.9, compared
to 11.4 in my results. I have not been able to find any accounting numbers on
markups so far, but a mean of 11.4% is most likely too low. The executive/big
family type cars at the top of Table 5 (Mercedes E to Saab 9.5) all have relatively
high markups, ranging from 19 to 32%. This is consistent with the observation that
these models are in a niche with few competitors of similar regard. Further down
the list markups are generally lower, consistent with the fact that characteristics
space is more crowded in that area.
In Tables 7-10 each row shows the elasticites for a car with respect to the price
of the cars in each column, for the same sample of cars used previously to represent
the spectrum of choices in the market. Tables 7 and 8 are elasticities computed
with method I, and Tables 9 and 10 are elasticities computed with method II. In
Tables 7 and 9, the models displayed are the ones used previously to represent the
spectrum of choices in the market, while Tables 8 and 10 display the top selling 21
cars. Broadly the cars have been arranged with the most expensive in the top-left
corner, and the cheapest in the bottom-right corner.
The elasticities for the representative sample of cars in Table 7 exhibit a pattern
where cross-price elasticities of cars that are far away from each other are zero or
very low. Accordingly the areas furthest away from the diagonal mostly mostly
consist of zeros. On the diagonal are own-price elasticities, and broadly speaking,
as one moves further away from the diagonal, one gets to cross elasticities with
products that are more different. In the top left and the bottom right areas of the
matrix, the belt of positive cross elasticities around the diagonal is thin. Since these
extreme areas represent products at the fringes of characteristics space, they have
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fewer substitutes. Moving towards the middle of the matrix, where characteristics
space is more densely filled with products, the belt around the diagonal gets thicker,
since products have more substitutes. Moving away from the diagonal, it is gener-
ally true that cross elasticities gradually get lower, as they represent products that
are gradually more different from the product at the diagonal. Cross elasticities
higher than one are normally only found for adjacent or almost adjacent products.
In Table 8 the belt around the diagonal is much thicker. The products in this
matrix are the best selling cars, and are located at the centre of characteristics space,
which is where they appeal to the largest number of consumers. These products
are therefore closer substitutes than those in the previous table, which included
the models at the fringes of characteristics space. Accordingly, cross elasticities are
positive for almost all products. It is still true, however, that elasticities are lower
the further away they are from the diagonal.
Overall, the substitution patterns resulting from method I seem very reasonable.
The size of the substitution effects is clearly too high, however. Implied markups
from these elasticities are almost all well below one percent of price, many virtually
zero. Bajari and Benkard (2005) also find that elasticities are unreasonably high in
their application to demand for personal computers. They suggest that the result
is due to the assumption of perfect information about all products on the part of
consumers, and conclude that this is unlikely to hold with a choice set containing
700 products. To mitigate this problem they remove from the choice set any product
with a market share of less than 0.75%. This left them with only 24 products, and
median own price elasticity fell from -100 to -11. I follow their choice, but in way
that is less ad-hoc. By removing all but the modal variants of each model, the
choice set becomes that used by the previous literature, including BLP. All models
are still included. The last column of Table 5 shows that the modal variant usually
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represents a very large proportion of the total sales of the model. I also tried to
remove all models with market shares of less than 0.5%, leaving 40 products. This
gave a median own price elasticity of -5, but the market share threshold is hard to
justify.
As expected, elasticities are much lower with method II. This also means that
many more cross elasticities are zero. In Table 9, the belt of positive cross elasticities
around the diagonal is much narrower than in Table 7. Removing all but the modal
variant of each model removes a model from areas of characteristics space which
it does in fact cover, but which are not covered by the modal variant. In these
areas of characteristics space it may be close neighbours with other models whose
modal variants are quite different from its own modal variant. In this way, products
which are in fact substitutes in variant-space (which is what the consumer faces)
are not in model-space. The general features of the substitution patterns remain
unchanged when moving from method I to method II. In table 9, products in the
middle of the matrix have more substutes than the ones on the fringes, and the high
selling products in Table 10 have many more substitutes than the ones in Table
9. The size of the elasticities is now much more reasonable, with all but three of
the own elasticities being single digit for the top selling products. It appears that
low market share products are more likely to have strangely high elasticities, such
as the Mercedes S-class in Table 9, with -51. This is possibly because reavealed
preference conditions constrain taste parameters less for special (low market share)
products than for products in the more densely populated parts of characteristics
space, leading to bad estimates of these consumers’ preferences. For the higher-
selling products, elasticities largely appear reasonable. Some examples of seemingly
reasonable high cross elasticities between similar products are the two SUVs, Range
Rover and VW Touareg (1.28 and 0.34) or Ford Mondeo and VW Passat (0.96 and
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3.04).
The question of how a model’s location in characteristics space when it changes
from a set of points (many variants) to one point (only modal variant) affects the
predicted best substitutes is important. Table 11 shows the ten best substitutes
for four randomly chosen high-selling products in a densely populated area of char-
acteristics space. The substitutes are ranked according to their elasticities with
respect to the price of the sample car. (I also tried to rank substitutes using deriva-
tives or displacement ratios, but this did not make much of a difference.) To the
left are best substitutes for one-variant case and to the right is the many-variants
case. The number of substitutes that are commmon to the two cases is 6 out of
10 for the VW Golf, 5 for the Toyota Avensis, 3 for the Ford Focus, and 2 for the
Audi A4. As expected, the inclusion of all variants appears to make a difference.
Bajari and Benkard’s pure characteristics model results in elasticities that are
too high. This is confirmed by my results. Their suggestion is that consumers
cannot perfectly process or obtain the information on all available products when
their number is very high. It appears that in most cases this problem cannot re-
ally be solved by simply dropping products, since the researcher has to guess what
products consumers actually do consider. Leaving out secondary variants of each
model like here is one way to proceed, but clearly not ideal. To the argument
about imperfect information, it could also be countered that consumers only need
to collect detailed information on a relatively small number of products, since they
can ascertain at almost no cost that most products are out of the question any-
way. Another explanation for the high elasticities would be that consumers have
idiosyncratic tastes for products. This would imply that after a given price change
for product A, many people who originally would choose product A, still choose
it even if there is a product B which is extremely similar in all objective respects,
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simply because there is a subjective reason that they find A better than B. Other
consumers may feel the same way about B. This type of effect cannot be captured by
unobserved characteristics like the one estimated in this model, because two prod-
ucts with similar characteristics and similar price also will have similar estimated
unobserved characteristic. Finding a way of estimating a multidimensional unob-
served characteristic could possibly go some way towards mitigating the problem.
The objections to logit models discussed above have in common that they claim
that characteristics space expands too much with the logit error, making products
look more different than they really are. Possibly, though, it expands too little in
a pure characteristics model.
6 Conclusion
I estimate the Bajari-Benkard model on recent car data from Norway, whereas
previous applications of this model have been to personal computers and housing
(Bajari and Kahn 2005). The model has several advantages over the BLP model. It
can be estimated with data from one time period and one market, unlike BLP which
requires many markets for identification. It can also accomodate data with a much
larger number of characteristics than what is possible in BLP. I used 30, whereas
the numerical properties of BLP are unstable even with a much smaller number.
BLP assumes that taste coefficients are independently normally distributed. The
Bajari-Benkard model makes no parametric assumptions on the taste distributions,
and allows for dependence between the distributions. In BLP, simulation error
becomes a big problem when the number of products is very large (Berry, Linton,
and Pakes 2004). In the Bajari-Benkard model, a large number of products is an
advantage for the estimation of taste distributions, although it appears that the
number needs to be reduced afterwards to avoid excessive substitution effects.
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Although the model as used here seems practically useful, especially since it only
requires one cross section of data, the procedure of removing variants cannot be
defended theoretically. Ideally the model should give reasonable elasticities with all
variants left in, since this is the choice set actually faced by consumers. The cause of
this problem is not known. Bajari and Benkard’s argument of imperfect information
is not fully satisfactory, especially as long as there are alternative explanations of the
problem that are equally consistent with the observed facts, such as an idiosyncratic
taste term in the true utility functions.
There is no conclusive evidence to suggest that the Bajari-Benkard style pure
characteristics model employed in this paper is inferior to the BLP as a way to
estimate demand for car models on market level data. There are also several regards
in which this model appears to be superior to BLP. On the downside, however,
this model does not seem to fulfill its promise of being able to estimate demand
systems for a very large number of differentiated products. The need to reduce the
number of products in the choice set, although defensible from a practical viewpoint,
is ad-hoc and theoretically unsatisfactory. There is an unexplained problem of
elasticities that are too high in this model, as this and the original application
show. Further work should investigate whether that is a feature that is driven by
the pure characteristics assumption.
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Table 1: Product characteristics of best-selling products
Unobs.
Bodytype No. of Price Length Cyl. vol. char. Sales Rank in
modal var. variants (mode) (mean) (min) (max) (mode) (mode) (mean) (min) (max) (modal var.) (total) total sales
Volvo V70 station 6 5.26 5.06 4.32 5.81 4.71 2.40 0.70 0.51 0.90 887 2349 13
Nissan X-Trail SUV 4 3.90 3.89 3.55 4.33 4.46 2.18 0.64 0.46 0.81 1647 2039 15
Honda CR-V SUV 1 3.55 3.55 3.55 3.55 4.64 2.00 0.25 0.25 0.25 1914 1914 18
Toyota RAV4 SUV 3 3.46 3.29 3.02 3.46 4.20 2.00 0.66 0.56 0.83 1305 2609 11
Subaru Forester station 1 3.36 3.36 3.36 3.36 4.45 1.99 0.74 0.74 0.74 1978 1978 16
VW Touran minivan 5 3.17 3.25 2.95 3.63 4.39 1.90 0.35 0.26 0.52 2015 3303 6
VW Passat station 13 3.12 3.47 2.50 5.58 4.68 1.90 0.30 0.18 0.44 1525 3501 5
Ford Mondeo station 16 3.12 3.63 2.50 5.42 4.80 2.00 0.42 0.21 0.62 1710 3239 7
Audi A4 station 24 3.01 4.55 2.93 10.34 4.58 1.60 0.60 0.27 0.81 639 2411 12
Toyota Avensis station 17 3.00 3.29 2.44 4.30 4.70 1.79 0.54 0.35 0.73 2049 6301 1
Opel Vectra station 17 2.78 3.28 2.45 3.72 4.82 1.80 0.52 0.40 0.68 1629 2996 8
Renault Megane minivan 21 2.55 2.58 1.95 3.42 4.25 1.60 0.45 0.31 0.70 595 1884 20
Mazda 6 station 12 2.54 3.11 2.51 4.00 4.70 1.80 0.33 0.25 0.46 994 2205 14
Skoda Octavia station 11 2.49 2.59 1.91 3.27 4.51 1.90 0.36 0.07 0.58 547 1866 21
Volvo S40 station 12 2.37 3.11 2.37 5.09 4.51 1.59 0.53 0.27 0.69 1161 1939 17
Toyota Corolla hatchback 19 2.30 2.55 2.10 3.40 4.18 1.60 0.51 0.26 0.77 1787 5205 3
Ford Focus station 21 2.30 2.70 1.79 3.18 4.45 1.60 0.65 0.36 0.77 917 2712 10
VW Golf hatchback 14 2.29 2.65 2.01 3.06 4.20 1.60 0.39 0.17 0.62 2697 5662 2
Peugeot 307 hatchback 17 2.25 2.75 1.96 4.32 4.20 1.59 0.41 0.15 0.55 1272 4454 4
VW Polo hatchback 5 1.78 2.01 1.78 2.34 3.90 1.20 0.49 0.31 0.76 1483 1901 19
Toyota Yaris hatchback 9 1.60 1.91 1.60 2.13 3.61 1.00 0.54 0.43 0.67 1363 2914 9
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Table 2: Product characteristics of sample products
Unobs.
Bodytype No. of Price Length Cyl. vol. char. Sales Rank in
modal var. variants (mode) (mean) (min) (max) (mode) (mode) (mean) (min) (max) (modal var.) (total) total sales
Porsche 911 coup 3 12.70 13.65 12.70 14.75 4.43 3.60 0.80 0.73 0.90 4 6 172
Ast. Martin DB9 coup 1 21.36 21.36 21.36 21.36 4.71 5.93 0.54 0.54 0.54 2 2 185
Range Rover SUV 2 9.49 11.26 9.49 13.03 4.95 2.93 0.74 0.51 0.98 41 46 132
VW Touareg SUV 4 7.12 9.28 7.12 11.47 4.75 2.46 0.40 0.07 0.94 84 116 99
Audi A8 sedan 5 9.30 12.86 9.30 18.15 5.05 2.97 0.69 0.55 0.89 13 37 137
Mercedes S-class sedan 5 9.80 12.33 9.80 14.80 5.04 3.22 0.79 0.60 0.94 6 15 157
Mercedes E-class sedan 21 5.41 8.47 5.12 16.88 4.82 2.15 0.71 0.38 0.97 607 1571 25
BMW 5-series sedan 14 4.71 6.77 4.09 10.84 4.84 2.17 0.50 0.20 0.78 545 1049 39
Audi A4 station 24 3.01 4.55 2.93 10.34 4.58 1.60 0.60 0.27 0.81 639 2411 12
BMW 3-series station 28 3.22 4.87 2.95 10.37 4.48 1.80 0.45 0.08 0.71 649 1569 26
Ford Mondeo station 16 3.12 3.63 2.50 5.42 4.80 2.00 0.42 0.21 0.62 1710 3239 7
VW Passat station 13 3.12 3.47 2.50 5.58 4.68 1.90 0.30 0.18 0.44 1525 3501 5
Volvo S40 station 12 2.37 3.11 2.37 5.09 4.51 1.59 0.53 0.27 0.69 1161 1939 17
Citron C5 station 11 2.90 3.63 2.85 5.49 4.84 1.75 0.47 0.16 0.89 341 968 41
Toyota Avensis station 17 3.00 3.29 2.44 4.30 4.70 1.79 0.54 0.35 0.73 2049 6301 1
VW Golf hatch-back 14 2.29 2.65 2.01 3.06 4.20 1.60 0.39 0.17 0.62 2697 5662 2
Opel Astra hatch-back 21 2.10 2.44 1.95 3.66 4.25 1.60 0.51 0.16 0.92 731 1756 22
Toyota Yaris hatch-back 9 1.60 1.91 1.60 2.13 3.61 1.00 0.54 0.43 0.67 1363 2914 9
Peugeot 206 hatch-back 12 1.52 2.13 1.52 3.20 3.83 1.12 0.50 0.27 0.72 636 1724 23
Fiat Punto hatch-back 1 1.39 1.39 1.39 1.39 3.80 1.24 0.51 0.51 0.51 82 82 111
Daewoo Matiz hatch-back 1 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 3.49 0.80 0.58 0.58 0.58 63 63 120
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Table 3: Summary statistics
Variable Unit Mean Sales Min Max Lower Upper
bound bound
mean -weighted on coef- on coef-
mean on ficient on ficient
in % of in % of
price price
length metres 4.44 4.4 3.49 5.19 0 100
cylinder volume litres 2.1 1.76 0.8 6 0 100
fuel costs kroner/km 0.68 0.63 0.27 1.42 -40 0
diesel dummy 0.3 0.28 0 1 -20 60
kw*diesel kw*dummy 0.28 0.24 0 2.3 0 100
kw*petrol kw*dummy 0.78 0.61 0 3.68 0 100
doors squared count/10 1.99 2.26 0.4 3.6 -60 60
doors count 4.37 4.72 2 6 0 60
seats squared count/10 2.54 2.65 0.4 8.1 -60 60
seats count 4.97 5.11 2 9 0 60
air bags count 5.29 5.44 0 9 0 20
4WD count 0.19 0.21 0 1 -20 40
automatic count 0.42 0.35 0 1 -20 60
weight 1000 kilogr. 1.4 1.32 0.78 2.52 -60 60
cylinders count 4.53 4.06 2 12 -20 20
gears*automatic count*dummy 2.13 1.78 0 7 0 40
gears*manual count*dummy 3.05 3.36 0 6 0 40
new model this year dummy 0.03 0.03 0 1 0 20
changed model this year dummy 0.05 0.05 0 1 0 20
german dummy 0.29 0.24 0 1 -20 20
french dummy 0.15 0.12 0 1 -20 20
asian dummy 0.21 0.34 0 1 -20 20
american dummy 0.15 0.13 0 1 -20 20
swedish dummy 0.06 0.08 0 1 -20 20
sedan dummy 0.24 0.11 0 1 -40 40
hatch-back dummy 0.23 0.29 0 1 -40 40
station wagon dummy 0.25 0.37 0 1 -40 40
multi-purpose/minivan dummy 0.11 0.11 0 1 -40 40
off-road/SUV dummy 0.07 0.11 0 1 -40 40
convertible dummy 0.06 0.01 0 1 -40 40
unobserved (estimated) - 0.51 0.52 0.07 0.99 0 100
price 100.000 kroner 4.08 2.96 1.15 21.36 Coef-
-ficient
fixed
at -1
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Table 4: Unobserved characteristics for sample models with variants
Unobs.
Make Model Cyl.vol. Length Price Bodytype char.
’Mercedes-Benz E 1.8 4.8 5.12 sedan 0.90
’Mercedes-Benz E 1.8 4.8 5.60 station 0.96
’Mercedes-Benz E 2.2 4.8 5.41 sedan 0.95
’Mercedes-Benz E 2.2 4.8 5.94 station 0.97
’Mercedes-Benz E 2.6 4.8 6.03 sedan 0.69
’Mercedes-Benz E 2.6 4.8 6.40 sedan 0.78
’Mercedes-Benz E 2.6 4.8 6.30 sedan 0.79
’Mercedes-Benz E 2.6 4.8 6.50 station 0.77
’Mercedes-Benz E 2.6 4.8 6.90 station 0.85
’Mercedes-Benz E 2.6 4.8 6.81 station 0.85
’Mercedes-Benz E 3.2 4.8 7.52 sedan 0.62
’Mercedes-Benz E 3.2 4.8 7.87 sedan 0.72
’Mercedes-Benz E 3.2 4.8 7.35 sedan 0.65
’Mercedes-Benz E 3.2 4.8 8.35 station 0.78
’Mercedes-Benz E 3.2 4.8 7.84 station 0.74
’Mercedes-Benz E 4.0 4.8 10.07 sedan 0.38
’Mercedes-Benz E 5.0 4.8 11.17 sedan 0.39
’Mercedes-Benz E 5.0 4.8 11.50 sedan 0.44
’Mercedes-Benz E 5.0 4.8 11.93 station 0.47
’Mercedes-Benz E 5.4 4.8 16.30 sedan 0.60
’Mercedes-Benz E 5.4 4.8 16.88 station 0.63
’Peugeot 607 2.0 4.8 3.65 sedan 0.59
’Peugeot 607 2.0 4.8 3.85 sedan 0.76
’Peugeot 607 2.2 4.8 4.25 sedan 0.66
’Peugeot 607 2.2 4.8 4.45 sedan 0.81
’Peugeot 607 3.0 4.8 5.85 sedan 0.22
’Audi A4 1.6 4.6 2.93 sedan 0.62
’Audi A4 1.6 4.6 3.01 station 0.65
’Audi A4 1.8 4.6 3.80 sedan 0.51
’Audi A4 1.8 4.6 4.00 sedan 0.53
’Audi A4 1.8 4.6 3.33 sedan 0.43
’Audi A4 1.8 4.6 3.81 sedan 0.66
’Audi A4 1.8 4.6 3.98 station 0.62
’Audi A4 1.8 4.6 4.19 station 0.63
’Audi A4 1.8 4.6 3.52 station 0.53
’Audi A4 1.8 4.6 4.00 station 0.75
’Audi A4 2 4.6 3.39 sedan 0.63
’Audi A4 2 4.6 4.76 sedan 0.59
’Audi A4 2 4.6 3.81 sedan 0.73
’Audi A4 2 4.6 3.54 station 0.70
’Audi A4 2 4.6 4.76 station 0.66
’Audi A4 2 4.6 4.01 station 0.81
’Skoda OCTAVIA 1.4 4.6 1.91 hatchback 0.43
’Skoda OCTAVIA 1.4 4.6 1.91 station 0.47
’Skoda OCTAVIA 1.6 4.6 2.25 hatchback 0.29
’Skoda OCTAVIA 1.6 4.6 2.28 station 0.43
’Skoda OCTAVIA 1.8 4.6 2.71 hatchback 0.45
’Skoda OCTAVIA 1.8 4.6 3.20 station 0.07
’Skoda OCTAVIA 1.8 4.6 3.27 station 0.34
’Skoda OCTAVIA 1.8 4.6 2.49 station 0.40
’Skoda OCTAVIA 1.8 4.6 2.90 station 0.58
’Skoda OCTAVIA 2.0 4.6 2.49 hatchback 0.28
’Skoda OCTAVIA 2.0 4.6 3.07 hatchback 0.24
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Table 5: Markups for best-selling products ordered by price
Make Model Cyl. Price Markup Markup Own Units Units Sales
vol. as price sold sold modal
(P-MC) % of elast- modal total % of
price icity var. total
’Mercedes-Benz E 2.2 5.4 1.1 21 -5.4 607 1571 39
’Volvo V70 2.4 5.3 1.1 21 -5.8 887 2349 38
’Bmw 5 2.2 4.7 1.5 32 -3.2 545 1049 52
’Audi A6 1.8 4.4 0.8 19 -7.5 470 1614 29
’Saab 9.5 2.0 4.1 1.1 26 -3.8 812 1406 58
’Nissan X-TRAIL 2.2 3.9 0.5 12 -9.0 1647 2039 81
’Mercedes-Benz C 1.8 3.7 0.3 7 -14.9 515 1160 44
’Honda CR-V 2.0 3.5 1.3 36 -3.0 1914 1914 100
’Subaru LEGACY 2.0 3.5 0.3 9 -19.5 639 1050 61
’Toyota RAV4 2.0 3.5 0.4 12 -8.5 1305 2609 50
’Mitsubishi OUTLANDER 2.0 3.4 0.5 15 -7.1 721 1106 65
’Subaru FORESTER 2.0 3.4 0.3 10 -10.6 1978 1978 100
’Bmw 3 1.8 3.2 0.2 7 -13.5 649 1569 41
’Volkswagen TOURAN 1.8 3.2 1.0 32 -3.9 2015 3303 61
’Suzuki VITARA 2.0 3.1 0.2 6 -16.4 1040 1365 76
’Saab 9.3 1.8 3.1 0.4 14 -7.2 736 1478 50
’Volkswagen PASSAT 1.8 3.1 0.6 20 -5.1 1525 3501 44
’Ford MONDEO 2.0 3.1 0.6 19 -5.2 1710 3239 53
’Peugeot 407 1.6 3.0 0.5 17 -9.9 355 953 37
’Audi A4 1.6 3.0 0.3 10 -15.3 639 2411 27
’Toyota AVENSIS 1.8 3.0 0.8 25 -4.8 2049 6301 33
’Citroen C5 1.8 2.9 0.2 6 -22.6 341 968 35
’Volvo V50 1.8 2.9 0.4 13 -15.6 705 1247 57
’Opel ZAFIRA 1.8 2.8 0.7 26 -3.9 360 885 41
’Opel VECTRA 1.8 2.8 0.5 19 -5.4 1629 2996 54
’Renault MEGANE 1.6 2.5 0.6 25 -4.4 595 1884 32
’Mazda 6 1.8 2.5 0.2 7 -13.6 994 2205 45
’Audi A3 1.6 2.5 0.1 5 -22.8 1009 1286 78
’Nissan PRIMERA 1.6 2.5 0.1 5 -46.7 217 1025 21
’Renault LAGUNA 1.6 2.5 0.2 8 -17.1 487 827 59
’Skoda OCTAVIA 1.8 2.5 0.3 13 -7.8 547 1866 29
’Suzuki LIANA 1.6 2.4 0.6 25 -5.1 1439 1446 100
’Volvo S40 1.6 2.4 0.8 35 -3.7 1161 1939 60
’Citroen XSARA 1.6 2.3 0.2 10 -10.3 225 768 29
’Toyota COROLLA 1.6 2.3 0.6 25 -4.4 1787 5205 34
’Ford FOCUS 1.6 2.3 0.3 14 -7.7 917 2712 34
’Mitsubishi LANCER 1.6 2.3 0.1 6 -22.8 372 609 61
’Volkswagen GOLF 1.6 2.3 0.1 6 -19.5 2697 5662 48
’Peugeot 307 1.6 2.2 0.5 22 -4.6 1272 4454 29
’Mazda 3 1.6 2.2 0.1 3 -56.1 576 841 68
’Opel ASTRA 1.6 2.1 0.2 10 -10.4 731 1756 42
’Opel MERIVA 1.6 2.1 0.6 28 -3.7 603 1107 54
’Suzuki IGNIS 1.4 1.9 0.2 12 -9.1 474 932 51
’Citroen C3 1.4 1.9 0.0 2 -51.1 254 623 41
’Volkswagen POLO 1.2 1.8 0.6 33 -3.3 1483 1901 78
’Ford FIESTA 1.4 1.8 0.1 5 -21.5 508 641 79
’Hyundai GETZ 1.4 1.6 0.2 9 -11.1 1106 1284 86
’Toyota YARIS 1.0 1.6 0.4 24 -4.2 1363 2914 47
’Skoda FABIA 1.2 1.6 0.2 10 -10.7 519 1106 47
35
Table 6: Sample markups from BLP reproduced
Make Model Markup as
% of price
BMW 7 29.27
Lexus LS 32.78
Cadillac Seville 30.8
Lincoln Town Car 26.13
Acura Legend 24.66
Nissan Maxima 21.04
Buick Century 23.87
Ford Taurus 26.65
Honda Accord 21.44
Chevy Cavalier 22.46
Ford Escort 19.02
Nissan Sentra 15.54
Mazda 323 15.86
36
Table 7: Model price elasticities of sample products, computed with all variants 904 products
Porsche 911 -5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ast. Martin DB9 0.1 -15 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Range Rover 0.0 0.0 -12 3.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
VW Touareg 0.0 0.0 1.5 -60 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.9 0.5 0.0 0.9 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Audi A8 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.6 -84 1.7 20 3.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mercedes S-class 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.5 -88 40 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mercedes E-class 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.9 0.7 -19 1.8 4.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
BMW 5-series 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.0 2.9 -34 4.6 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Audi A4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 4.8 2.4 -57 4.3 0.8 3.4 0.6 0.2 1.3 1.4 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0
BMW 3-series 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 11 -34 0.8 4.7 1.0 0.0 3.1 3.9 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ford Mondeo 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.2 -43 1.7 0.3 0.9 1.1 0.3 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
VW Passat 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 4.0 1.2 2.5 -17 0.2 0.2 0.6 1.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Volvo S40 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 1.1 0.5 0.6 0.2 -21 0.1 1.4 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Citron C5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.8 0.0 2.7 0.4 0.1 -32 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Toyota Avensis 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 -37 1.7 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
VW Golf 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.0 4.1 -27 2.6 0.3 0.8 0.0 0.0
Opel Astra 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.0 0.5 2.2 0.2 0.4 0.1 2.3 6.8 -71 0.3 0.8 0.0 0.0
Toyota Yaris 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.2 0.3 -12 0.3 0.0 0.0
Peugeot 206 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.0 2.4 1.1 0.5 -40 0.1 0.2
Fiat Punto 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.4 3.7 -14 1.0
Daewoo Matiz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.3 0.0 4.0 0.6 -42
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Table 8: Model price elasticities of best-selling products, computed with all variants 904 products
Volvo V70 -14 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Nissan X-Trail 0.0 -22 0.3 2.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Honda CR-V 0.0 0.4 -9 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Toyota RAV4 0.1 2.2 1.6 -12 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.0 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Subaru Forester 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.2 -15 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
VW Touran 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -12 0.1 0.1 0.8 1.2 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.0
VW Passat 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 -17 2.5 4.0 0.6 1.5 0.1 0.2 1.7 0.2 0.1 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ford Mondeo 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.7 -43 0.7 1.1 24 0.1 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0
Audi A4 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.4 1.3 0.9 3.4 0.8 -57 1.3 1.1 0.1 0.2 1.1 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.4 0.2 0.0 0.3
Toyota Avensis 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.6 -37 1.1 0.2 2.8 0.2 0.3 2.0 0.1 1.7 0.4 0.0 0.0
Opel Vectra 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.9 26 1.2 2.9 -50 0.1 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.1 1.1 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0
Renault Megane 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.3 1.2 0.1 -56 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.3 1.7 2.2 18 0.2 0.0
Mazda 6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 1.8 0.4 11.2 1.5 0.1 -29 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Skoda Octavia 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 2.9 1.5 2.6 1.6 1.0 0.4 0.6 -34 0.2 0.7 0.4 2.4 0.5 0.0 0.2
Volvo S40 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.6 1.1 1.4 0.9 0.2 0.1 0.2 -21 0.2 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0
Toyota Corolla 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.7 4.9 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.2 -18 0.7 1.2 0.4 0.1 1.5
Ford Focus 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.7 1.3 0.4 1.2 0.9 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.5 -30 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2
VW Golf 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.9 4.1 0.5 1.1 0.0 1.1 0.1 0.6 0.1 -27 0.2 0.6 0.3
Peugeot 307 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.8 0.1 7.4 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.3 -17 0.0 0.0
VW Polo 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 2.8 0.1 -12 0.4
Toyota Yaris 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 3.1 0.3 1.2 0.0 0.2 -12
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Table 9: Price elasticities of sample products, computed with modal variants only, 199 products
Porsche 911 -6.1 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ast. Martin DB9 0.04 -5.4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Range Rover 0.00 0.00 -6.4 1.28 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
VW Touareg 0.00 0.00 0.34 -12.0 0.27 0.02 0.51 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Audi A8 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.28 -16.6 0.18 2.68 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mercedes S-class 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 1.60 -51.5 23.7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mercedes E-class 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 1.21 1.06 -5.4 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BMW 5-series 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.03 -3.2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Audi A4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -15.3 5.34 0.52 0.19 0.13 0.32 0.52 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BMW 3-series 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.5 -13.5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.06 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ford Mondeo 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.00 -5.2 0.96 0.01 0.02 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
VW Passat 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 3.04 -5.1 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Volvo S40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.01 -3.7 0.04 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Citron C5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.10 -22.6 0.83 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Toyota Avensis 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.24 0.25 0.00 0.07 0.09 -4.8 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
VW Golf 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -19.5 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Opel Astra 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.10 -10.3 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
Toyota Yaris 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 -4.2 0.15 0.01 0.00
Peugeot 206 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.36 -6.7 0.23 0.30
Fiat Punto 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.25 1.66 -11.9 0.69
Daewoo Matiz 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.80 0.27 -12.3
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Table 10: Price elasticities of best-selling products, computed with modal variants only, 199 products
Volvo V70 -5.8 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Nissan X-Trail 0.16 -9.0 0.05 0.92 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Honda CR-V 0.09 0.04 -3.0 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Toyota RAV4 0.20 1.64 0.12 -8.5 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Subaru Forester 0.61 0.00 0.03 0.00 -10.6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
VW Touran 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.00 -3.9 0.09 0.14 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00
VW Passat 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 -5.1 3.04 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.64 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ford Mondeo 0.32 0.34 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.09 0.96 -5.2 0.09 0.26 0.44 0.00 0.07 0.16 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Audi A4 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.19 0.52 -15.3 0.52 0.50 0.00 0.18 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00
Toyota Avensis 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.25 0.09 -4.8 0.26 0.02 0.83 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Opel Vectra 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.02 0.20 0.70 -5.4 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Renault Megane 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.18 0.04 -4.4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00
Mazda 6 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.26 0.13 3.84 0.13 0.00 -13.6 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Skoda Octavia 0.87 0.01 0.08 0.06 0.14 0.02 0.70 0.61 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04 -7.8 0.01 0.07 0.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Volvo S40 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.08 0.37 0.12 0.00 0.02 0.01 -3.7 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Toyota Corolla 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 -4.4 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.68
Ford Focus 0.15 0.00 0.03 0.00 1.13 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.85 0.02 0.01 -7.7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
VW Golf 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -19.5 0.01 0.02 0.00
Peugeot 307 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -4.6 0.00 0.00
VW Polo 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.03 0.00 -3.2 0.00
Toyota Yaris 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.26 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -4.2
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Figure 1: Scatter plots of joint densities of taste coefficients for sample products.
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Table 11: Closest substitutes for four sample products, computed using highest cross-
elasticities w.r.t. the sample products, when choice set has modal variant only
Make Model ltr m pri Bodytype
Volkswagen GOLF 1.6 4.2 2.3 hatchback
’Bmw 1 1.6 4.2 2.5 hatchback
’Audi A3 1.6 4.2 2.5 hatchback
’Kia CERATO 1.6 4.4 2.2 hatchback
’Daewoo KALOS 1.2 3.8 1.3 hatchback
’Subaru JUSTY 1.4 3.8 2.0 hatchback
’Daewoo LACETTI 1.4 4.4 1.6 hatchback
’Audi A2 1.4 3.8 2.3 MPV/minivan
’Subaru IMPREZA 1.6 4.4 2.5 station
’Skoda FABIA 1.2 4.2 1.6 station
’Volvo V50 1.8 4.6 2.9 station
Toyota AVENSIS 1.8 4.8 3.0 station
’Mazda 6 1.8 4.8 2.5 station
’Fiat STILO 1.6 4.6 2.1 station
’Mitsubishi LANCER 1.6 4.4 2.3 station
’Bmw 3 1.8 4.4 3.2 station
’Nissan 350Z 3.4 4.4 7.9 coup
’Volvo V50 1.8 4.6 2.9 station
’Audi A6 1.8 4.8 4.4 station
’Kia CERATO 1.6 4.4 2.2 hatchback
’Kia CARENS 1.6 4.4 2.1 MPV/minivan
’Citroen C5 1.8 4.8 2.9 station
Ford FOCUS 1.6 4.4 2.3 station
’Mitsubishi SPACE 1.6 4 2.2 station
’Chrysler PT 1.6 4.2 2.6 station
’Opel AGILA 1 3.6 1.5 station
’Hyundai ACCENT 1.4 4.2 1.7 hatchback
’Skoda OCTAVIA 1.8 4.6 2.5 station
’Subaru FORESTER 2 4.4 3.4 station
’Subaru LEGACY 2 4.8 3.5 station
’Hyundai ATOS 1 3.6 1.3 hatchback
’Opel MERIVA 1.6 4 2.1 MPV/minivan
’Ford FIESTA 1.4 4 1.8 hatchback
Audi A4 1.6 4.6 3.0 station
’Bmw 3 1.8 4.4 3.2 station
’Volkswagen CADDY 1.4 4.4 2.1 station
’Daewoo NUBIRA 1.6 4.6 2.0 station
’Fiat STILO 1.6 4.6 2.1 station
’Fiat MAREA 1.6 4.4 2.2 station
’Audi A3 1.6 4.2 2.5 hatchback
’Volvo V50 1.8 4.6 2.9 station
’Skoda FABIA 1.2 4.2 1.6 station
’Fiat DOBLO 1.6 4.2 2.1 station
’Audi A2 1.4 3.8 2.3 MPV/minivan
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Table 12: Closest substitutes for four sample products, computed using highest cross-
elasticities w.r.t. the sample products, when choice set has all variants
Make Model ltr m pri Bodytype
Volkswagen GOLF 1.6 4.2 2.3 hatchback
’Kia CERATO 1.6 4.4 2.2 hatchback
’Daewoo LACETTI 1.4 4.4 1.6 hatchback
’Daewoo KALOS 1.2 3.8 1.3 hatchback
’Bmw 1 1.6 4.2 2.5 hatchback
’Fiat STILO 1.6 4.6 2.1 station
’Audi A3 1.6 4.2 2.5 hatchback
’Volkswagen CADDY 1.4 4.4 2.1 station
’Audi A2 1.4 3.8 2.3 MPV/minivan
’Opel ASTRA 1.6 4.2 2.1 hatchback
’Jeep WRANGLER 2.4 3.8 3.9 Off-road/SUV
Toyota AVENSIS 1.8 4.8 3.0 station
’Mazda 3 1.6 4.4 2.2 hatchback
’Mitsubishi CARISMA 1.6 4.4 2.3 hatchback
’Kia CERATO 1.6 4.4 2.2 hatchback
’Fiat STILO 1.6 4.6 2.1 station
’Nissan 350Z 3.4 4.4 7.9 coup
’Mitsubishi LANCER 1.6 4.4 2.3 station
’Alfa Romeo 156 1.8 4.4 3.0 sedan
’Renault LAGUNA 1.6 4.8 2.5 station
’Honda CIVIC 1.6 4.2 2.3 hatchback
’Mazda 6 1.8 4.8 2.5 station
Ford FOCUS 1.6 4.4 2.3 station
’Fiat MAREA 1.6 4.4 2.2 station
’Alfa Romeo 147 1.6 4.2 2.6 hatchback
’Chrysler PT 1.6 4.2 2.6 station
’Nissan PATROL 3 5 7.1 Off-road/SUV
’Opel ASTRA 1.6 4.2 2.1 hatchback
’Opel AGILA 1 3.6 1.5 station
’Ford FUSION 1.4 4 2.0 MPV/minivan
’Ford FIESTA 1.4 4 1.8 hatchback
’Seat LEON 1.6 4.2 2.1 hatchback
’Nissan MICRA 1.2 3.8 1.7 hatchback
Audi A4 1.6 4.6 3.0 station
’Alfa Romeo 166 2 4.8 4.5 sedan
’Nissan PATROL 3 5 7.1 Off-road/SUV
’Jeep WRANGLER 2.4 3.8 3.9 Off-road/SUV
’Bmw 3 1.8 4.4 3.2 station
’Volkswagen BORA 1.6 4.4 2.5 sedan
’Volkswagen CADDY 1.4 4.4 2.1 station
’Seat TOLEDO 1.6 4.4 2.3 sed
’Bmw 5 2.2 4.8 4.7 sedan
’Mercedes-Benz C 1.8 4.6 3.7 sedan
’Mercedes-Benz E 2.2 4.8 5.4 sedan
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Figure 2: Aggregate (smoothed) marginal densities of some taste coefficients .
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Figure 3: Aggregate (smoothed) pairwise joint densities of some taste coefficients .
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